# Draft, Sketch, and Prove: Guiding Formal Theorem Provers with Informal Proofs

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#### Abstract

The formalization of existing mathematical proofs is a notoriously difficult process. 1 Despite decades of research on automation and proof assistants, writing formal 2 proofs remains arduous and only accessible to a few experts. While previous studies З to automate formalization focused on powerful search algorithms, no attempts were 4 made to take advantage of available informal proofs. In this work, we introduce 5 Draft, Sketch, and Prove (DSP), a method that maps informal proofs to formal proof 6 sketches, and uses the sketches to guide an automated prover by directing its search 7 to easier sub-problems. We investigate two relevant setups where informal proofs 8 are either written by humans or generated by a language model. Our experiments 9 and ablation studies show that large language models are able to produce well-10 structured formal sketches that follow the same reasoning steps as the informal 11 proofs. Guiding an automated prover with these sketches enhances its performance 12 from 20.9% to 39.3% on a collection of mathematical competition problems.



Figure 1: **Draft, Sketch, and Prove.** Starting with an informal statement, our framework yields a formal proof through a three-stage process: drafting informal proofs, mapping them into formal sketches, and proving the remaining conjectures. Concretely, an informal statement is a mathematical problem described in a mixture of natural and mathematical languages (e.g., formulae in LATEX). Then, we use a large language model to autoformalize each informal proof into a formal sketch, which is a skeleton of the formal proof with open conjectures left unproven (indicated by the sproof> blocks). The formal sketch mirrors the structure of the informal proof. Finally, the open conjectures/gaps inside each formal sketch are proved by an off-the-shelf prover.

# 14 **1 Introduction**

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Formal proof automation is a challenging task that has been the focus of increased attention in recent
years (Bansal et al., 2019b; Polu & Sutskever, 2020; Lample et al., 2022; Jiang et al., 2022; Wu et al.,
2022). However, deep learning approaches have not been as successful as in other domains, mainly
because of the scarcity of formal data. To address the scarcity of formal proofs, previous studies
have proposed to use synthetic data (Wu et al., 2021), self-supervision (Polu & Sutskever, 2020;

Han et al., 2022), or reinforcement learning (Bansal et al., 2019a; Polu et al., 2022) to synthesize

Submitted to 36th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2022) Workshop on MATH-AI. Do not distribute. additional formal training data. Although these methods alleviate the data insufficiency to some degree, none are able to capitalize on the bulk of human-written mathematical proofs.

We give a schematic diagram of the DSP method in Figure 1 and describe it in Section 2. Recent 23 work (Wu et al., 2022) demonstrates the feasibility of automatically translating informal statements 24 into formal ones with large language models. DSP goes beyond and leverages large language models 25 to generate formal proof sketches (Wiedijk, 2003) from informal proofs. Proof sketches consist of 26 high-level reasoning steps that can be interpreted by formal systems such as interactive theorem 27 provers. They differ from complete formal proofs in that they contain sequences of intermediate 28 conjectures without justification. An example of informal proof with its corresponding formal proof 29 sketch is provided in Appendix A. In the last step of DSP, we elaborate the formal proof sketch into 30 a full formal proof using an automated prover to prove all intermediate conjectures. 31 We perform experiments to generate formal proofs of problems from the miniF2F dataset (Zheng 32

we perform experiments to generate formal proofs of problems from the minip2F dataset (Zheng et al., 2022) and show that a large portion of theorems can be proved automatically with this method. We investigate two settings where the informal proofs are either written by humans or drafted by a large language model trained on mathematical text. These two settings correspond to situations frequently occurring during the formalization of existing theories, where informal proofs are usually available, but sometimes left as exercises to the reader or missing due to space limits in the margin.

#### **38** Contributions:

- We introduce a novel approach to leverage informal proofs to guide automated provers with
   formal proof sketches.
- To evaluate our approach, we build a dataset of manually curated informal statements and informal proofs aligned with formal statements in the miniF2F dataset (Zheng et al., 2022).
- We increase the proportion of problems solved by an automated prover on miniF2F from 20.9% to 37.7%, given language-model-generated informal proofs, and up to 39.3% when proofs are written by humans.

# 46 2 Method

In this section, we describe our *Draft, Sketch, and Prove (DSP)* method for formal proof automation,
which leverages informal proofs to guide automated formal theorem provers with proof sketches. We
assume that each problem comes with an informal statement and a formal statement describing the
problem. Our pipeline consists of three stages (depicted in Figure 1), which we present below.

#### 51 2.1 Drafting informal proofs

52 The initial phase of the DSP method consists in finding an informal proof for a problem according to its description in natural mathematical language. The resulting informal proof is seen as a *draft* for the 53 subsequent steps. In mathematical textbooks, proofs of theorems are in general provided, but are some-54 times missing or incomplete. Therefore, we consider two settings corresponding to the presence or ab-55 sence of the informal proofs. In the first, we assume that a "ground-truth" informal proof (i.e., written 56 by a human) is available, which is a typical scenario in the formalization of existing mathematical the-57 ories. In the second setting, we make a more general assumption that the ground-truth informal proof 58 is not given, and draft proof candidates with a large language model trained on informal mathematical 59 data. The language model removes the dependence on human proofs and can produce multiple alterna-60 tive solutions for every problem. Although there is no easy way to automatically verify the correctness 61 of these proofs, the informal proof only needs to be *useful* for producing a sketch in the next stage. 62

#### 63 2.2 Mapping informal proofs into formal sketches

A formal proof sketch encodes the structure of a solution and leaves out low-level details (Wiedijk,
2003). Intuitively, it is a partial proof that outlines high-level conjecture statements. A concrete
example of a proof sketch is shown in Figure 2. Although informal proofs often leave aside low-level
details, (e.g., by stating their triviality), these details cannot be discharged in a formal proof, making
straightforward informal-to-formal proof translation difficult. Instead, we propose to map informal
proofs to formal proof sketches that share the same high-level structures. The low-level details

<sup>70</sup> missing from a proof sketch can later be filled by an automated prover. Since large informal-formal <sup>71</sup> parallel corpora do not exist, standard machine translation methods are unsuitable for this task.

parallel corpora do not exist, standard machine translation methods are unsuitable for this task.
 Rather, we use the few-shot learning abilities of a large language model. Specifically, we prompt the

<sup>72</sup> model with a few example pairs containing *informal proofs* and their corresponding *formal sketches*,

followed by an informal proof yet to be translated. We then let the model generate the subsequent

<sup>75</sup> tokens to obtain the desired formal sketch. We refer to this model as an autoformalizer.

#### 76 **2.3 Proving open conjectures in the sketches**

As the last part of the process, we rely on off-the-shelf automated provers to fill in the missing 77 low-level details in the proof sketches, where an "automated prover" refers to a system capable 78 of producing formally verifiable proofs. Our framework is agnostic to the specific choice of the 79 automated prover: it can be symbolic provers such as heuristic tactics or proof automation tools, 80 neural-network-based provers, or even hybrid approaches. If the automated prover successfully closes 81 all the gaps in the proof sketch, it returns the final formal proof which can be checked against the 82 problem's specification. If the automated prover fails (e.g., it exceeds the allocated time limit), we 83 consider the evaluation to be unsuccessful. 84

# **85 3 Experiments**

# 86 3.1 Dataset and evaluation

We evaluate our method on the miniF2F dataset (Zheng et al., 2022). The dataset contains the *formal statements* of 488 problems from high-school mathematical competitions, written in three formal

languages: Lean, HOL-Light, and Isabelle. They are split into a valid set and a test set, composed of

<sup>90</sup> 244 problems each. In this work, we choose to experiment with Isabelle.

The miniF2F dataset is comprised of problems from three source categories: (1) 260 problems sampled from the MATH dataset (Hendrycks et al., 2021); (2) 160 problems from actual high-school math-

ematical competitions (AMC, AIME, and IMO); (3) 68 crafted problems at the same difficulty level as

94 (2). We employ three different methods to obtain informal statements and proofs from these sources.

For source (1), we access the informal statements and proofs from the MATH dataset; for (2), we

<sup>96</sup> retrieve their informal statements and proofs from the AOPS website <sup>1</sup>; and for (3), we manually write <sup>97</sup> down their informal statements and proofs. Thus we gather a parallel set of 488 informal statements,

<sup>97</sup> down then informal statements and proofs. This we gather a paramet set of 466 informal statements, <sup>98</sup> informal proofs, and formal statements. This dataset provides the informal statements and proofs for

<sup>99</sup> our experiment in the human-as-informal-proof-writer setting and will be released upon publication.

Our task is to generate formal proofs for problems as they are formally stated in miniF2F. We consider a proof valid if and only if it (a) does not contain "cheating" keywords (sorry and oops) that exit a proof without completing it, and (b) Isabelle is able to verify the corresponding formal statement

<sup>103</sup> with the proof. We use the Portal-to-ISAbelle API by Jiang et al. (2021) to interact with Isabelle.

# 104 **3.2 Baselines**

Sledgehammer As a baseline, we attempt to prove the formal statement directly with Sledgehammer,
 a popular proof automation tool in Isabelle. We use the default Sledgehammer configuration in
 Isabelle2021, including a 120-second timeout and the five automated theorem provers (Z3, CVC4,
 SPASS, Vampire, E). Appendix D gives a more thorough introduction to Sledgehammer.

Sledgehammer + heuristics Occasionally, Sledgehammer may fail without trying simple yet effective tactics. As a second, stronger baseline, we create an automated prover that tries 11 common tactics (auto, simp, blast, fastforce, force, eval, presburger, sos, arith, linarith, auto simp: field\_simps) for high-school level algebra and number theory problems. If every attempted tactic fails, or times out after 10 seconds, it falls back to Sledgehammer.

Language models for proof search Finally, we include baselines representative of state-of-theart neural theorem proving in Isabelle, specifically Thor (Jiang et al., 2022) and Thor with expert iteration on autoformalized data (Wu et al., 2022). GPT-f with expert iteration (Polu et al., 2022) and HyperTree Proof Search (HTPS) (Lample et al., 2022) can solve 36.6% and 41.0% of the problems

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://artofproblemsolving.com/community

Table 1: **Proving success rates on the miniF2F dataset with Isabelle** In the table are the success rates of four baselines, the DSP method with human and language model informal proofs, as well as two ablation studies, on the validation and the test sets of miniF2F. The highest success rates on each set are highlighted in bold. The performance difference between ablation studies and DSP with human informal proofs are enclosed in brackets.

Success rate	miniF2F-valid	miniF2F-test
Baselines		
Sledgehammer	9.9%	10.4%
Sledgehammer + heuristics	18.0%	20.9%
Thor (Jiang et al., 2022)	28.3%	29.9%
Thor + expert iteration (Wu et al., 2022)	37.3%	35.2%
Draft, Sketch, and Prove		
Human informal proof	42.6%	<b>39</b> .3%
Codex informal proof	40.6%	35.3%
8B Minerva informal proof	40.6%	35.3%
62B Minerva informal proof	$\mathbf{43.9\%}$	37.7%

on miniF2F-test. However, they are not directly comparable to our method, as they rely on the Lean theorem prover, which greatly influences the performance due to the different tactics and automation.

#### 120 3.3 Results

We cover our detailed experimental setup in Appendix E. In Table 1, we display the proportion of 121 successful formal proofs found on the miniF2F dataset with the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. 122 The results include the four baselines described in Subsection 3.2 and the DSP method with human-123 written proofs and model-generated proofs. From the table, we can see that the automated prover with 124 11 additional heuristic tactics significantly increases the performance of Sledgehammer, boosting its 125 success rate from 9.9% to 18.0% on the validation set of miniF2F and from 10.4% to 20.9% on the 126 test set. The two baselines using language models and proof search (Thor and Thor + expert iteration) 127 achieve success rates of 29.9% and 35.2% on the test set of miniF2F, respectively. 128

With informal proofs written by humans, the *DSP* method achieves success rates of 42.6% and 39.3% on the validation and test sets of miniF2F. A total of 200 out of 488 problems can be proved in this way. The Codex model and the Minerva (8B) model give very similar results in solving problems on miniF2F: they both guide the automated prover to solve 40.6% and 35.3% of problems on the validation and the test sets respectively. This is corroborated by Lewkowycz et al. (2022)'s observation that these two models have comparable performances in solving mathematical problems.

When we switch to the Minerva (62B) model, the success rates rise up to 43.9% and 37.7% re-135 spectively. Compared to human-written informal proofs, its success rates are 1.3% higher on the 136 validation set and 1.6% lower on the test set. In total, the Minerva (62B) model is able to solve 199 137 problems on miniF2F, one fewer than with human proofs. The DSP method is effective in guiding 138 the automated prover under both settings that we study: using either human informal proofs or 139 language-model-generated informal proofs. DSP almost doubles the prover's success rate and results 140 in a new state-of-the-art performance on miniF2F with Isabelle. Moreover, the larger Minerva model 141 is almost as helpful as a human in guiding the automated prover in solving problems. 142

# 143 **4** Conclusion

In this paper, we introduced *Draft, Sketch, and Prove (DSP)*, a novel approach that takes advantage of informal proofs to synthesize formal proofs. We demonstrated its feasibility and effectiveness by reaching state-of-the-art performance on the miniF2F dataset with the Isabelle theorem prover. Central to our method are formal proof sketches that mirror the high-level reasoning structures of informal proofs. Our ablations showed that the ability to automatically convert informal proofs to proof sketches is critical to the success of *DSP*.

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# 292 Appendix

# 293 A A proof sketch in Isabelle

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Informal Statement: Show that for any real number a, 10a < 28a^2 + 1.
Informal Proof:
It suffices to show 0 \leq 28a^2 - 10a + 1. First, consider completing the square for 28a^2 - 10a and
observe that \left(a - \frac{5}{28}\right)^2 = a^2 - \frac{10}{28}a + (5/28)^2. Since 0 \le \left(a - \frac{5}{28}\right)^2, we get 0 \le a^2 - \frac{10}{28}a + (5/28)^2.
Multiplying by 28 and simplifying gives 0 \le 28a^2 - 10a + (25/28). Since 25/28 < 1, the result
follows.
Formal Proof Sketch:
theorem algebra binomnegdiscrineg 10alt28asgp1:
  fixes a :: real
  shows "10 * a \leq 28 * a<sup>2</sup> + 1"
proof - (* it suffices to show 0 \le 28a^2 - 10a + 1 *)
  have c0: "0 < 28a<sup>2</sup> - 10a + 1"
  proof - (* observe that (a - (5/28))^2 = a^2 - (10/28)a + (5/28)^2 *)
    have c1: "(a - (5/28))<sup>2</sup> = a<sup>2</sup> - 10/28a + (5/28)<sup>2</sup>" <···>
     (* \text{ we get } 0 \le a^2 - (10/28)a + (5/28)^2 *)
    have c2: "0 ≤ a<sup>2</sup> - 10/28a + (5/28)<sup>2</sup>" using c1 < ··· >
     (* Multiplying by 28 and simplifying gives 0 \le 28a^2 - 10a + (25/28) *)
    have c3: "0 \le 28a^2 - 10a + 28((5/28)^2)" using c2 < ... >
    have c4: "0 ≤ 28a<sup>2</sup> - 10a + 28((5/28)*(5/28))" using c3 <···>
    have c5: "0 \le 28a^2 - 10a + (25/28)" using c4 < ... >
     (* Since 25/28 < 1, the result follows. *)
     show ?thesis using c5 < ··· >
  qed
  show ?thesis < ··· >
qed
```

Figure 2: A proof sketch in Isabelle. The problem "Show that for any real number a,  $10a \le 28a^2 + 1$ " is given with an informal proof and an associated formal proof sketch. The sketch first rewrites the original statement (c0), which is proved through 5 intermediary conjectures (c1..c5). We use a special token ( $< \cdots >$ ) to indicate that the conjecture is "open" and should be tackled by an automated prover later. To facilitate the alignment between the informal and formal languages, we annotate the formal proof sketch examples with informal proof segments (shown in red), which are immediately followed by their formal counterparts.

#### **B** Background and Related Work

**Interactive theorem proving** Modern verification systems for mathematics are centered around 295 interactive theorem provers (ITPs), such as Isabelle (Paulson, 1994), Lean (Moura et al., 2015), 296 Coq (Barras et al., 1997), or Metamath (Megill & Wheeler, 2019). ITPs embed the mathematical 297 definitions and theorems onto a solid logical foundation (e.g., Higher-Order Logic, Dependent Type 298 Theory) implemented by their kernels. Every theorem must be checked by the kernel to be recognized 299 by the ITP. To be proved formally, a theorem is first stated in the ITP's programming language, and 300 iteratively simplified into simpler objectives (or subgoals), until it can be reduced to already proven 301 facts. In this paper, we will refer to proofs verified by a formal theorem prover as formal proofs, and 302 proofs written in "standard" mathematics (e.g. in LATEX) as informal proofs. 303

Machine learning for formal proof synthesis Several approaches propose to combine machine learning with modern interactive theorem provers (Yang & Deng, 2019; Gauthier et al., 2021), and build upon the recent success of language models (Polu & Sutskever, 2020; Han et al., 2022; Polu et al., 2022; Jiang et al., 2022; Lample et al., 2022). These methods typically rely on sequence-tosequence models (Sutskever et al., 2014) to generate the next step (or tactic) of a proof given the current proof state and perform search over the generated subgoals using powerful search methods such as MCTS (Silver et al., 2018). Because search is computationally expensive, these language
models are relatively small (with fewer than 1 billion parameters). Our method contrasts with these
approaches in that we use a significantly reduced number of calls to the models, but also much larger
language models (with up to 175 billion parameters) that showcase outstanding few-shot learning
abilities (Brown et al., 2020).

Machine learning for informal reasoning Language models have also been used in the context 315 of purely informal mathematics (Lample & Charton, 2020; Hendrycks et al., 2021; Welleck et al., 316 2021; Drori et al., 2022; Welleck et al., 2022). Nevertheless, Lewkowycz et al. (2022) note that for 317 quantitative question answering, models are prone to generate false positives: the model guesses 318 the right answer while providing an incorrect proof. These errors are hard to spot without human 319 inspection. Worryingly, the frequency of false positives increases with the difficulty of the problem. 320 Our method builds on these findings and translates informal proofs into formal proofs. Since ITPs 321 are logically grounded, once a formal proof is checked by them, we are guaranteed its correctness. 322

**Autoformalization** In a position paper, Szegedy (2020) argued for attaining formal mathematical 323 data from informal sources with neural networks. Wang et al. (2020) performed preliminary exper-324 iments where the evaluation was limited to text-level similarities on synthetic datasets. Recently, 325 Wu et al. (2022) found that large language models (Chen et al., 2021; Chowdhery et al., 2022) are 326 capable of few-shot statement autoformalization. Namely, a small number of examples is enough to 327 328 learn to perform informal-to-formal translation of statements. In this paper, we investigate whether these findings can generalize to *proof autoformalization*, i.e., whether large language models can be 329 used to translate informal proofs into formal ones. 330

# **C** Conjectures and the declarative proof style

Interactive theorem provers such as Isabelle and Mizar use a *declarative* proof style (Syme, 1997), in which a proof is interleaved with conjectures and their corresponding proofs. Syme (1997) stated that the list of conjectures in a declarative proof should be analogous to a proof sketch found in a mathematical textbook and sufficiently convincing for the reader. In practice, ITP users often prove a theorem by writing down a list of conjectures (a "formal sketch"), then attempt to find a proof of each conjecture (fill a "gap") with an automated system.

# 338 D Sledgehammer

Sledgehammer (Paulson, 2010) is a powerful system that automates reasoning with the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. It works by flattening the goals encoded in the higher-order logic used by Isabelle/HOL into other logics (e.g., first-order logic) which can then be fed into automated theorem provers such as  $E^2$ , CVC4 <sup>3</sup>, Z3 <sup>4</sup>, Vampire <sup>5</sup>, and SPASS <sup>6</sup>. If any of these automated theorem provers succeeds in finding the proof in their own corresponding format, Sledgehammer reconstructs the proof in Isabelle/HOL with certified provers (metis, meson, and smt), which is relatively more interpretable by humans.

As a practical example of using Sledgehammer, one can declare a conjecture in Isabelle/HOL: have "4 dvd (a::nat)  $\implies$  2 dvd a" and call Sledgehammer immediately afterwards. If Sledgehammer succeeds, it will return a proof step that proves the conjecture. In this example, the step is by (meson dvd\_trans even\_numeral), which uses the meson resolution prover and two facts: that the division relation is transitive and that 4 is an even number. If Sledgehammer does not find the proof or timeouts, it will report failure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>https://wwwlehre.dhbw-stuttgart.de/ sschulz/E/E.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>https://cvc4.github.io/index.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>https://vprover.github.io/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>https://www.spass-prover.org/download/index.html

# 352 E Experimental Setup

**Drafting** When informal proofs are generated, we condition a large language model on informal statements to sample 100 informal proofs per problem. Specifically, we use the Codex code-danvici-002 model (Chen et al., 2021) through the OpenAI API, and the 8B and the 62B versions of the Minerva model from Lewkowycz et al. (2022). We use greedy decoding for Codex and nucleus sampling (Holtzman et al., 2019) with temperature T = 0.6 and top-p = 0.95 for Minerva models.

**Sketching** For sketching, we manually prepare 20 autoformalization examples of the format (*informal* 358 statement, informal proof, formal statement, formal sketch), to form a pool of high-quality demon-359 strations. Of these 20 examples, 10 are of the *algebra* type and 10 are of the *number theory* type. All 360 examples are from the validation set of the miniF2F dataset and can be found in the supplementary 361 materials. The sketches contain in-line comments as in Figure 2. If the name of the problem gives 362 away its type (algebra or number theory), we only use examples of the corresponding type. We also 363 ensure that the sampled few-shot examples do not contain the problem being solved. The prompt 364 365 is composed of 3 uniformly randomly sampled example from the pool and the current problem's (informal statement, informal proof, formal statement). We use this prompt to query the same Codex 366 367 model to get the desired proof sketches. We use greedy decoding and a maximum of 2048 tokens in the generated sequence. For all the experiments, we control the total number of queries made to 368 Codex per problem to be 100. This means 100 queries per human informal solution and one query 369 per language-model-generated solution . 370

**Proving** To prove the conjectures left open by the formal sketch, we use the Sledgehammer + heuristics automated prover described in Subsection 3.2. We execute the automated prover on every open conjecture in the sketch to synthesize a formal proof that can be verified by Isabelle.

#### 374 F Analysis

#### 375 F.1 Ablation studies

**Ablation of in-line comments** To facilitate the alignment between the informal proofs and the 376 formal proof sketches, we copy relevant segments of the informal proofs as in-line comments in 377 the sketches. In the manually constructed prompt examples, these comments are prefixed to the 378 corresponding Isabelle code blocks, as shown in Figure 2 (the text in red). We hypothesize that this 379 technique is beneficial for large language models to synthesize formal sketches. To validate this 380 hypothesis, we perform an ablation study by removing the in-line comments in the prompt examples 381 before running the experiment. The results are displayed in Table 1. We find that without in-line 382 comments, the success rates drop by 4.9% and 2.8% on the validation and test sets respectively. We 383 conclude that having in-line comments is helpful for generating formal proof sketches. 384

Ablation of sketching Having formal proof sketches as an intermediate data mode that are later 385 completed by automated provers is central to our method. To study the effect of this critical component, 386 we conduct an experiment without the sketching operation. Namely, we replace the formal proof 387 sketches with complete formal proofs in the prompt examples. As a result, the large language model 388 will also generate formal proofs instead of sketches. We directly verify whether these generated proofs 389 are valid. The results in this setup are presented in Table 1. The results reveal that without sketching, 390 the success rate on miniF2F decreases by 9.8% and 9.0% on the validation and test sets respectively. 391 The drastic performance difference indicates the essential role of proof sketches in our approach. 392

Scaling properties of ablation studies To understand the effect of the ablations on the DSP 393 method's scaling properties, we vary the number of autoformalization attempts per problem and plot 394 395 the number of successful proofs found on the miniF2F dataset in Figure 3 (left). Three methods are contrasted: the original DSP method with human informal proofs, the DSP method without in-line 396 comments, and the DSP method without sketching. It can be seen from the figure that with the original 397 398 DSP method, the performance reaches a plateau (no new proofs are found) after 70 autoformalization attempts are made for each problem. For the ablation study with no in-line comments, the plateau is 399 reached much faster, after around 50 autoformalization attempts. This method solves 181 problems in 400 total. The ablation study without sketching can solve 154 problems on miniF2F. In comparison, with 401 human informal proofs, only 7 autoformalization attempts are required to reach this performance. 402



Figure 3: Number of problems solved on miniF2F against the number of autoformalization attempts per problem Left: The figure displays the experiments carried out with the full human informal proofs. The curves represent the full *DSP* method (blue), formal proof sketches without the in-line comments (orange), and without the formal proof sketches (green). **Right:** This figure compares the experimental results with informal proof drafts written by humans (blue), the 62B Minerva model (red), the 8B Minerva model (brown), and the Codex model (pink).

#### 403 F.2 Language-model-generated proofs

Our experiments demonstrated that model-generated informal proofs from Minerva and Codex can
 help guide a formal theorem prover. In this section, we analyze the properties of these proofs further.
 Since the Minerva (62B) model gives the best overall performance on miniF2F, we focus on the
 informal proofs it produces in this section.

**Minerva helps solve one IMO problem** Interestingly, our approach manages to solve one problem 408 from the International Mathematical Olympiad (imo\_1959\_1) with a Minerva-generated solution, 409 but not with the human proof. For this problem, we present the successful Minerva-generated 410 informal proof draft and the formal proof in Figure 4. We hypothesize that the reason behind this 411 phenomenon is that human proofs might leave gaps between conjectures that are too difficult for 412 automated provers to solve. On the other hand, the diversity in language model informal proofs 413 makes some of them more amenable to automated provers. In Appendix G, we analyze the human 414 and the Minerva informal proofs for this problem in greater detail. 415

Manual evaluation of Minerva proofs Next, we analyze the relationship between the validity of the formal proofs and the correctness of the informal proofs. For our analysis, we randomly sample 50 Minerva proofs of different problems, which are then successfully converted to formal proofs. We then manually evaluate the correctness of these 50 informal proofs. Among them, 29 proofs (58%) are entirely correct, 16 are incorrect with a clearly identifiable incorrect step, and 5 "proofs" are nonsensical and simply rephrase the final conclusions of the problems.

Seeing that a total of 16 + 5 = 21 incorrect informal proofs can lead to successful formal proofs, 422 423 we study how they guide the automated formal prover despite having flaws themselves. The 21 proofs divide into 2 cases: In the first case, we find 13 problems for which the informal proofs are 424 mostly ignored, and the automated prover can find proofs by itself; In the other 8 problems, although 425 the informal proofs are wrong, the autoformalizer manages to *correct* them, either by ignoring the 426 erroneous steps or by stating their correct versions in the formal proof sketches. This suggests 427 that the autoformalizer has some understanding of the mathematical statements and is not merely 428 translating them from an informal language to a formal language. It is robust to slight noises in its 429 input. In Appendix H, we present 3 case studies comparing the human and Minerva informal proofs. 430 Particularly, Figure 7 shows a completely correct example and one example of each pathological case. 431

Is there a way to detect which Minerva proofs are correct, without human evaluation? For a preliminary investigation, we filter out all the problems that can be solved directly with the automated prover from the 50 and are left with 27 informal proofs. Of these 27, 21 are completely correct, 6 still contain small errors, but none are nonsensical. With this simple filter, we achieve a precision of 77.8% and a recall of 72.4% in identifying correct Minerva informal proofs.

Scaling properties of human and Minerva proofs To understand the influence of different 437 informal proof sources on the scaling properties of DSP, we plot the number of successful proofs found 438 on miniF2F against the number of autoformalization attempts per problem in Figure 3 (right). Note 439 that for each problem, we have 1 informal proof by a human and 100 informal proof drafts by each 440 language model. The one human proof is used 100 times for formal proof sketch generation, while 441 each language model proof draft is used only once. We notice that the 62B Minerva model results 442 in more successful proofs than the smaller (8B) Minerva model and the Codex model consistently 443 for any number of attempts. The 8B Minerva model and the Codex model behave similarly, both 444 finding 185 proofs. Human informal proofs yield better results than Minerva (62B) for 1 - 100445 autoformalization attempts. However, the difference is small (1 problem) when 100 are made. 446

#### 447 G A proof to an international mathematical olympiad problem

With the Minerva-generated solutions, a proof to the problem imo\_1959\_p1 is discovered. This is the first problem of the first ever International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO). The informal problem statement, Minerva-generated informal solution, and DSP's formal proof are shown in Figure 4.

In Figure 4, we can see that the autoformalizer in DSP (a large language model), copies over parts of the informal proof generated by Minerva as in-line comments to precede their corresponding formal proof blocks. The formal proof does not use the first sentence of the informal proof solution as it is already identical to the formal statement. We also notice that the large language model selects relevant premises after writing down the conjectures (the steps starting with using) despite not every premise is strictly needed.

The formal proof creates 5 conjectures (4 have statements and 1 show statement) which are all subsequently proved by our automated theorem prover. The step to prove the statement have "gcd ( $21 \times n + 4$ ) ( $14 \times n + 3$ ) = 1" involves 2 verified low-level provers smt and z3 and 10 lemmas/facts from outside the scope of the language model. It is highly unlikely that either the large language model or the automated theorem prover can finish this proof on its own.

462 Unsuccessful human-written proof. In contrast, the human-written informal proof of this IMO
 463 problem did not lead to a successful formal proof. The human-written proof is:

Denoting the greatest common divisor of a, b as (a, b), we use the Euclidean algorithm:

$$(21n+4, 14n+3) = (7n+1, 14n+3) = (7n+1, 1) = 1$$

465 It follows that  $\frac{21n+4}{14n+3}$  is irreducible. Q.E.D.

A key difference between the Minerva proof and the human proof is the way that invoking the Euclidean algorithm is described. The Minerva proof explicitly writes out the results of the Euclidean algorithm (e.g.  $21n + 4 = 1 \cdot (14n + 3) + 7n + 1$ ), which are translated into the sketch (*c1* in Figure 4). The human proof introduces new notation to express the results indirectly in terms of greatest common divisors, which ends up being less suitable for sketching. For example, below is a sketch generated with the human proof, which has a conjecture that is semantically incorrect and hence cannot be closed by the automated prover:

```
473
    theorem
474
      fixes n :: nat
       shows "gcd (21*n + 4) (14*n + 3) = 1"
475
476
    proof
477
      have "(21*n + 4, 14*n + 3) = (7*n + 1, 14*n + 3)"
         ATP (* <---- UNSUCCESSFUL *)
478
       also have "... = (7*n + 1, 1)"
479
480
        ATP
       finally show ?thesis
481
        ATP
482
483
    qed
```

# 484 H More case analyses of human and Minerva informal proofs

**Statement:** Prove that the fraction  $\frac{21n+4}{14n+3}$  is irreducible for every natural number *n*. **Informal Proof (Minerva 62B):** We must show that gcd(21n + 4, 14n + 3) = 1. The Euclidean algorithm gives  $21n + 4 = 1 \cdot (14n + 3) + 7n + 1$  $14n + 3 = 2 \cdot (7n + 1) + 1.$ Since gcd(7n + 1, 1) = 1, we have gcd(21n + 4, 14n + 3) = 1. **Formal Proof:** theorem imo\_1959\_p1: fixes n :: nat **shows** "gcd (21\*n + 4) (14\*n + 3) = 1" proof -(\* The Euclidean algorithm gives 21n+4=1\cdot(14n+3)+7n+1 14n+3=2(cdot(7n+1)+1. \*)have c0: "21\*n + 4 = 1\*(14\*n + 3) + 7\*n + 1" by auto [ATP] have c1: "14\*n + 3 = 2\*(7\*n + 1) + 1" using c0 by auto [ATP] (\* Since \gcd(7n+1,1)=1, we have \gcd(21n+4,14n+3)=1. \*) then **have** "gcd (7\*n + 1) 1 = 1" using cl by auto [ATP] then have "gcd (21\*n + 4) (14\*n + 3) = 1" using cl by (smt (z3) BitM\_plus\_one ab\_semigroup\_add\_class.add\_ac(1) add.assoc c0 gcd.commute gcd\_add2 gcd\_add\_mult mult\_numeral\_1 numeral\_One numeral\_eq\_Suc numerals(1) semiring\_norm(3)) [ATP] then show ?thesis using cl by blast [ATP] qed

Figure 4: **IMO proof guided by a Minerva informal proof** An informal proof of the International Math Olympiad problem imo\_1959\_p1 generated by Minerva that led to a successful formal proof. The steps suffixed by a [*ATP*] identifier are generated by an automated theorem prover and the rest are by the DSP autoformalizer.

```
Statement: Given that f + 3z = 11 and 3(f - 1) - 5z = -68, show that f = -10 and z = 7.
Informal Proof (Minerva 62B):
We can solve for f in the first equation, obtaining f = 11 - 3z.
Then we can substitute this expression for f into the second equation,
obtaining 3(11 - 3z - 1) - 5z = -68.
Solving for z, we obtain z = 7.
Then, we can substitute this value of z into the expression for f, obtaining f = 11 - 3 \cdot 7 = -10.
Formal Proof:
theorem algebra_2varlineareq_fp3zeq11_3tfm1m5zeqn68_feqn10_zeq7:
  fixes f z::complex
  assumes h0: "f + 3*z = 11"
      and h1: "3*(f - 1) - 5*z = -68"
    shows "f = -10 \ < and > z = 7"
proof -
  (* We can solve for f in the first equation, obtaining f = 11 - 3z. *)
  have c0: "f = 11 - 3*z"
    using h0
    by (auto simp: field_simps) [ATP]
  (* Then we can substitute this expression for f into the second equation,
  obtaining 3 (11 - 3z - 1) - 5z = -68. *)
have c1: "3*(11 - 3*z - 1) - 5*z = -68"
    using h1 c0
    by auto [ATP]
  (* Solving for z, we obtain z = 7. *)
  have c2: "z = 7"
    using c1
    by auto [ATP]
  (* Then, we can substitute this value of z into the expression for f,
     obtaining f = 11 - 3 \pmod{7} = -10.*
  have "f = 11 - 3*7"
    using c0 c2
    by auto [ATP]
  then have c3: "f = -10"
    by auto [ATP]
  show ?thesis
    using c2 c3
    by auto [ATP]
qed
```

Figure 5: Algebra example with Minerva informal proof. An informal proof generated by Minerva that led to a successful formal proof. The autoformalizer generated a proof sketch containing all lines of the formal proof except for those with [*ATP*]. The sketch is structured according to the informal proof, containing five intermediate conjectures based on the informal proof. The autoformalizer generated in-line comments in the proof sketch (shown in red), which correctly identified an alignment between the formal and informal proofs.

```
Statement: For any integer a, show that a^2 \equiv
0 (mod 4) or a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{4}.
Informal Proof (Minerva 62B):
Let a = 2k for some integer k.
Then a^2 = 4k^2.
Since 4k^2 is divisible by 4, we have a^2 \equiv 0
(mod 4).
Now, let a = 2k + 1 for some integer k.
Then a^2 = 4k^2 + 4k + 1 = 4(k^2 + k) + 1.
Since k^2 + k is an integer, 4(k^2 + k) + 1 is
not divisible by 4.
Thus, a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{4}.
Formal Proof:
theorem numbertheory_sqmod4in01d:
  fixes a :: int
  shows " (a<sup>2</sup> mod 4 = 0)
  \langle or \rangle (a<sup>2</sup> mod 4 = 1)"
proof (cases "even a")
case True
 (* Let a=2k for some integer k.
    Then a^2=4k^2.
    Since 4k^2 is divisible by 4,
    we have a^2 \ge 0 
 then obtain k where "a=2*k"
   using evenE
   by auto [ATP]
 then have "a^2 = 4 k^2"
   unfolding power2_eq_square
   by auto [ATP]
 then have "a<sup>2</sup> mod 4 = 0"
   by auto [ATP]
 then show ?thesis
   by auto [ATP]
next.
case False
 (* Now, let a=2k+1 for some integer k.
    Then a^2=4k^2+4k+1=4(k^2+k)+1.
    Since k<sup>2+k</sup> is an integer,
    4(k^2+k)+1 is not divisible by 4.
    Thus, a^2 \ge 1 
 then obtain k where "a=2*k+1"
  using oddE by auto [ATP]
 then have "a<sup>2</sup> = 4 \times k^2 + 4 \times k + 1"
  unfolding power2_eq_square
  by (auto simp: field_simps) [ATP]
 then have "a<sup>2</sup> mod 4 = 1"
 by presburger [ATP]
 then show ?thesis
  by auto [ATP]
qed
```

**Statement:** For any integer a, show that  $a^2 \equiv$ 0 (mod 4) or  $a^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$ . Informal Proof (Minerva 62B):  $a \pmod{4} \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ Using that for any natural number  $k, a \equiv b$ (mod 4) implies  $a^k \equiv b^k \pmod{4}$ , we have  $a^2 \pmod{4} \in \{0, 1, 4, 9\}.$ Since  $4 \equiv 0 \pmod{4}$  and  $9 \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$ , the result follows. **Formal Proof:** theorem numbertheory\_sqmod4in01d: fixes a :: int **shows** " (a<sup>2</sup> mod 4 = 0)  $< or > (a^2 \mod 4 = 1)$ " proof - $(* a \setminus pmod 4 \setminus in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}. *)$ have c0: "a mod 4 \<in> {0, 1, 2, 3}" by auto [ATP] (\* Using that for any natural number k, a \equiv b \pmod 4 implies  $a^k \ge 0^k \ge 0^k \le 4, *$ have "a<sup>2</sup> mod 4 = (a mod 4)  $\langle sup \rangle$ 2 mod 4" by (smt (z3) numeral\_eq\_Suc power\_mod) [ATP](\* we have  $a^2 \pmod{4} (0, 1, 4, 9)$ . \*) **also have "...** \<in> {0, 1, 4, 9}" using c0 by auto [ATP] (\* Since 4 \equiv 0 \pmod 4 and 9 \equiv 1 \pmod 4, the result follows. \*) **finally show** ?thesis by auto [ATP] qed

Figure 6: Alternative proofs: Minerva (left) and human-written (right). In both proofs, the formal sketch is structured based on the informal proof. The Minerva informal proof and its sketch break the proof into even and odd cases. These cases are not explicitly stated in the informal proof, and the formal sketch makes them explicit (*cases "even a"*). Each case has three conjectures that are directly based on the informal proof. The sketch excludes parts that are not needed in the formal proof, for instance "Since  $k^2 + k$  is an integer,  $4(k^2 + k) + 1$  is not divisible by 4". The human proof uses a different strategy than the Minerva proof, based on the facts that  $a \pmod{4} \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$  and  $a^2 \pmod{4} \in \{0, 1, 4, 9\}$ . The sketch uses these as conjectures, synthesizes an intermediate step not in the informal proof, and excludes the last step of the informal proof.

```
Statement: For each plumbing repair job, Mr.
Wrench charges N dollars for coming out to
the house plus x dollars per hour that he works
at the house. He charged $97 for a one-hour
repair job and $265 for a five-hour repair job.
What is his charge for a two-hour repair job?
Show that it is $139.
Informal Proof (Minerva 62B):
Let N be the number of dollars charged for
coming out to the house and let x be the num-
ber of dollars per hour that Mr. Wrench works.
For the one-hour repair job, we have that the
total cost is N + x = 97.
For the five-hour repair job, we have that the
total cost is N + 5x = 265.
We subtract the first equation from the second
equation to obtain 4x = 168 \Rightarrow x = 42.
Plugging this back into the first equation, we
obtain that N = 55.
Therefore, for a two-hour repair job, the total
cost is 55 + 2x = 55 + 2(42) = | $139
Formal Proof:
theorem mathd_algebra_160:
  fixes n x ::real
  assumes "n + x = 97"
  and "n + 5 * x = 265"
  shows "n + 2 * x = 139"
proof -
  (* We subtract the first equation
  from the second equation to obtain
  4\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{168} \Rightarrow \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{42.} \star)
  have "4 * x = 168"
  using assms by auto [ATP]
  then have "x = 42"
  by auto [ATP]
  (* Plugging this back into
  the first equation, we obtain that
  N = 55. *)
  then have "n = 55"
  using assms by auto [ATP]
  (* Therefore, for a two-hour repair
  job, the total cost is
  55 + 2x = 55 + 2(42) = $139. *)
  then show ?thesis
  by (smt (z3) \langle x = 42 \rangle) [ATP]
qed
```

**Statement:** Show that for any real number xand any natural number n, if x > -1, then  $(1 + nx) \le (1 + x)^n$ . **Informal Proof (Minerva 62B):** This is true for n = 1. Now, suppose that this is true for n. Then we have that  $(1 + nx)^n = 1 + n^2x + n^3x^2 + \dots + nx^n$ 

 $(1+nx) = 1+n x+n x + \dots + nx$ 

$$\leq 1 + nx + n^{2}x^{2} + \dots + nx^{n} = (1+x)^{n}$$

and

$$(1+nx)^{n+1} = (1+nx)^n (1+nx)$$
  
$$\leq (1+x)^n (1+x) = (1+x)^{n+1}$$

Therefore, this is true for n + 1.

Formal Proof:

theorem induction\_lpxpownltlpnx: fixes x :: real and n :: nat assumes "-1 < x" shows "(1 + n\*x) \<le> (1 + x) ^n" proof (induct n) case 0 then show ?case by auto [ATP] next case (Suc n) then show ?case by (smt (z3) Bernoulli\_inequality assms) [ATP] ged

**Statement:** Determine the remainder of 1529 (mod 6). Show that it is 5.

Informal Proof (Minerva 62B): By definition,  $1529 \equiv 5 \pmod{6}$ .

Formal Proof:

```
theorem mathd_numbertheory_551 :
  "1529 mod 6 = (5::nat)"
by auto [ATP]
```

Figure 7: Three Types of Minerva proofs: correct proof (left), incorrect proof (right top), nonsensical proof (right bottom) In the correct Minerva proof, the formal sketch is structured based on the informal proof and steps are well-aligned. In the incorrect Minerva proof, the step "This is true for n = 1" is corrected by Codex in the formal sketch to "case 0" which starts the base case with n = 0 since natural numbers include 0. This is an explicit correction made by Codex and makes a slightly incorrect Minerva proof formalized successfully. Lastly, the meaningless proof contains only a single statement without any calculation or justification. However, Codex also chooses to directly show the statement without any calculation. This suggests that the problem itself could be considered simple by Codex.